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Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville: A New Analysis of the
Taking Issue or a Step Into Confusion?
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the tak-
ing of private property by the government without just compensation.' The
"law of the land" provision of the North Carolina Constitution has been inter-
preted to impose a similar prohibition.2 Not all interferences with property
rights, however, constitute a taking; otherwise, any land use regulation would
be subject to compensation, rendering government regulation impractical or
impossible.3 The standards for determining what constitutes a taking under
the federal and North Carolina constitutions have developed independently.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in considering the tak-
ing issue it has conducted a series of "ad hoc, factual inquiries."'4 In Responsi-
ble Citizens v. City ofAsheville s the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted
to develop a coherent approach analyzing what constitutes a taking under the
State constitution. This attempt, however, has left suspect some of the court's
earlier decisions and offers property owners less protection than they receive
under the federal constitution.
In Responsible Citizens several property owners challenged a city flood
zone ordinance that restricted the development of their property.6 Plaintiffs
contended that the cost of meeting the city's development standards was pro-
hibitive and effectively denied them the right to develop their land.7 They
challenged the ordinance on two grounds. First, they argued that the restric-
1. "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. This prohibition has been made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
2. "We recognize the fundamental right to just compensation so grounded in natural law
and justice that it is part of the fundamental law of this State. . . .This principle is considered in
North Carolina as an integral part of the 'law of the land' within the meaning of Article I, Section
19 of our State Constitution." Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 196, 293 S.E.2d 101, 107-
08 (1982). N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19 reads as follows:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by
the law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall
any person be subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or
national origin.
3. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). See also Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Penn Cent.
Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
5. 308 N.C. 255, 302 S.E.2d 204 (1983).
6. Id. at 256, 302 S.E.2d at 206. All new construction or substantial improvements in a
flood hazard district were required to be anchored to prevent flotation, collapse, or lateral move-
ment, and constructed with materials and utility equipment resistant to flood damage. Further-
more, all water and sewage systems had to be constructed to limit infiltration of flood waters. In
floodway and flood fringe districts all residential uses were prohibited; other construction was
permitted if it met the flood hazard district requirements and if its lowest habitable floor was at
least two feet above the regulatory flood elevation. Id. at 257-60, 302 S.E.2d at 206-07.
7. Id. at 264, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
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tions constituted a taking for which they were entitled to just compensation.8
Second, they argued that the ordinance violated the equal protection provi-
sions of both the State and federal constitutions "because it impose[d] a bur-
den only on those citizens in the flood hazard area strictly for the benefit of
those citizens with property outside the flood hazard area."9
The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that in ascertaining the valid-
ity of an equal protection challenge to a legislative classification, "'[t]he test is
whether the difference in treatment made by the law has a reasonable basis in
relation to the purpose and subject matter of the legislation.' "10 Since the city
had classified only lands that were prone to flooding, and the permissible ob-
ject of the legislation was to prevent harm from flooding, the court concluded
that the ordinance was constitutional.1 ' Furthermore, the court concluded
that the restriction did not amount to a taking under either the State or federal
constitution. 12 The court found no taking under the fifth amendment, 13 stat-
ing that nothing distinguished Responsible Citizens from Penn Central Trans-
portation v. City of New York, 14 in which the United States Supreme Court
had upheld an historic district ordinance. The Responsible Citizens court
found no violation of the North Carolina Constitution because plaintiffs had
not been deprived of all practical uses of their property and the property had
not been rendered valueless. 15
The tenth amendment reserves the police power to the states, 16 permitting
state regulation that promotes the public health, safety, morals, and welfare.' 7
Not every exercise of the police power, however, constitutes a taking. "Gov-
ernment could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." 18
If the government were required to compensate every governmentally induced
8. Id. at 256-57, 302 S.E.2d at 206.
9. Id. at 267, 302 S.E.2d at 212. The trial court dismissed the equal protection challenge on
the ground "that all persons, firms and corporations whose properties are located in said Flood
Hazard Districts are treated alike within said classification and the passage of said ordinance was
a valid exercise of the police power ...." Record at 22, Responsible Citizens.
10. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 268, 302 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting Guthrie v. Taylor, 279
N.C. 703, 714, 185 S.E.2d 193, 201 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972)).
11. Id.
12. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that even though the ordinance "seriously
depreciates the value of properties,. . . [the ordinance did] not substantially deprive the plaintiffs
...of the right to reasonable use of their property." Id. at 260, 302 S.E.2d at 208; Record at 22,
Responsible Citizens.
13. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 267, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
14. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 264-65, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. See State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 369, 211 S.E.2d 320, 322,
appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975); Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 278 N.C. 17,
178 S.E.2d 616 (1971); City of Raleigh v. Fisher, 232 N.C. 629, 61 S.E.2d 897 (1950). The cases
refer to police power as being inherent in the states.
17. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Even though this power
is reposed in the state legislature, it can be delegated to municipalities and counties. See State v.
Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975); Keiger v. Winston-
Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 278 N.C. 17, 178 S.E.2d 616 (1971); Marren v. Gamble, 237 N.C. 680,
75 S.E.2d 880 (1953).
18. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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reduction in an individual's net worth, the taxing power would be abrogated.19
Since first permitting land use regulation as an exercise of the police power,20
courts have struggled to determine when such regulation constitutes a taking
and requires compensation.
The North Carolina courts have focused primarily on the extent that an
ordinance interferes with the use of property. Land use regulation has been
held not to be a taking when the interference is minor. In Zopfi v. City of
Wilmington 21 property adjacent to plaintiffs' property was rezoned from resi-
dential to commercial use. The court held that this did not constitute a taking
because it had not interfered with plaintiffs' use of their property; they still
were free to use their property for residential purposes.22 That the rezoning of
the adjacent property reduced the value of plaintiffs' property was of no
consequence. 23
In State v. Joyner24 defendant operated a building material salvage shop
in an area that had been rezoned to prohibit such use. Because defendant held
the property under an oral lease, the lease was valid for no more than three
years.25 Even though defendant's use was frustrated completely, the rezoning
did not constitute a taking because defendant's expectation was only for a
three-year period. The court considered interference with such an insignifi-
cant interest to be insubstantial. 26
As these cases illustrate, insubstantial interference with the use of prop-
erty does not constitute a taking. The North Carolina courts have found a
taking only when property has been rendered valueless or the owner has been
deprived of all reasonable use.27 If the regulation prevents the owner from
conducting all permitted uses of the property, the regulation constitutes a tak-
ing.28 Simply because the landholder can comply with the regulation, how-
ever, does not relieve the government of a duty to pay just compensation. In
Helms v. City of Charlotte29 the trial court had found no taking since the prop-
erty owner still could comply with the uses permitted by the challenged zoning
ordinance. 30 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed because the trial
court had not found that the permitted uses were reasonable. The court con-
cluded that if the permitted uses were unreasonable, the regulation deprived
19. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
20. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 375 (1926) (actions under police
power do not require compensation because they are inherent in ownership).
21. 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968).
22. Id. at 433, 160 S.E.2d at 329.
23. Id. at 436, 160 S.E.2d at 332.
24. 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320, appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1965).
26. Joyner, 286 N.C. at 375-76, 211 S.E.2d at 326.
27. Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 653, 122 S.E.2d 817, 822 (1961).
28. Roberson's Beverages, Inc. v. City of New Bern, 6 N.C. App. 632, 637, 171 S.E.2d 4, 7
(1969), cert. denied, 276 N.C. 183 (1970).
29. 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
30. Id. at 656, 122 S.E.2d at 824.
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the owner of all reasonable use and constituted a taking.31
The measure of what is a reasonable use is not a rigid standard. If the
public interest is of lesser importance, the courts will find a lesser intrusion to
have denied the owner reasonable use. In State v. Jones32 the supreme court
imposed a lower threshold for finding an aesthetic zoning ordinance invalid
because such ordinances are of lesser public importance.33
The United States Supreme Court has not adopted such a reasonableness
standard. In addressing taking questions, the Court conducts "'essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries.' ,34 The Court focuses on the character of the govern-
ment's action 35 and the economic impact of the regulation, considering partic-
ularly the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations. 36
The Supreme Court is less likely to find a taking if the government's ac-
tion is a regulation instead of a physical invasion.37 When the government's
action rises to the level of a permanent physical occupation, the Court will find
a per se taking. 38 To evaluate the substantiality of a regulation's economic
impact, however, the Court has adopted a broad view of an owner's bundle of
property rights and a narrow view of the property interest affected. 39 Thus,
the Court has focused on whether the owner could make a reasonable use of
his property after the government's action.40 The Court has been most willing
to protect investment-backed expectations when the government's action
would have had the effect of denying the owner the fruits of some positive
investment.4'
31. The court stated that the permitted uses would have to be "practical, desirable and of
reasonable value." Id. at 657, 122 S.E.2d at 825.
32. 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
33. See id. at 526, 290 S.E.2d at 678-79. See also A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C.
207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979) (applying same standard to historic preservation ordinances). See gen.
erally Note, State v. Jones: Aesthetic Regulation-From Junkyards to Residences?, 61 N.C.L. REV.
942 (1983).
34. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (quoting Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
35. Id.
36. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
37. Compare Penn Central (upholding regulation of owner's use of air space over Grand
Central Station) with Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (denying govern-
ment navigational servitude over waters that had been made navigable through private invest-
ment; Court characterized government's action as "physical invasion").
38. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). For a discus-
sion of Supreme Court taking jurisprudence and an analysis of Loretto, see Note, Eminent Do-
main-Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.: Permanent Physical Occupation As A Taking, 62
N.C.L. REV. 153 (1983).
39. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. In Penn
Central the Court stated:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and at-
tempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.
... [The] Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. ...
Id.
40. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
41. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (expectation that privately
developed marina would remain private),
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In Responsible Citizens the North Carolina Supreme Court applied a
three-part test for analyzing the taking question under the North Carolina
Constitution.42 First, the court examined whether the object of the legislation
is within the scope of the police power. Second, it determined whether the
means employed are reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of
that goal. Third, it examined whether the interference with the owner's right
to use his property as he deems appropriate is reasonable.4 3 To determine
whether the object of the regulation in Responsible Citizens was within the
police power, the court looked exclusively at the findings of fact enumerated in
the ordinance. Since the purpose of the ordinance was to further the "public
health, safety, morals, and welfare," 44 the court concluded that the ordinance
fulfilled the first element. Similarly, the court held that the since the enacting
body had found the means to be necessary, the second element was fulfilled.45
The third prong of the test is based on North Carolina reasonable use
cases, but departs from the analysis in earlier supreme court cases. In Helms
the court had concluded that an intrusion is a taking if it deprives the owner of
all reasonable use of the property, or if it renders the property valueless. 46 In
Responsible Citizens, however, the court stated that both elements must be sat-
isfied.47 The pronouncement that both elements are required may have been
an inadvertent error, given that the court gleaned this rule from Helms.4 8
More importantly, however, the passage is merely dictum since neither taking
criterion was found in Responsible Citizens.49
Responsible Citizens identified a new factor to consider in ascertaining the
reasonableness of the restriction-the form of the restriction. The court la-
beled the regulation in Responsible Citizens a "conditional affirmative duty."50
Conditional affirmative duties require landowners to do something before
changing the use of their land.51 The ordinance in Responsible Citizens pro-
hibited new construction or substantial improvements on the affected property
unless specific requirements were satisfied.5 2 If a regulation imposes only a
conditional affirmative duty, it is not an unreasonable burden on the owner's
use because "[t]he regulations do not affect in any way the current use of each
42. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 261, 302 S.E.2d at 208 (citing A-S-P Assocs. v. City of
Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979)).
43. Id. at 261, 302 S.E.2d at 208.
44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The stated purpose of the ordinance was to
prevent or reduce loss of life, property damage, and the like due to flood. Responsible Citizens,
308 N.C. at 262, 302 S.E.2d at 209.
45. "Indeed, it can be argued that an ordinance requiring, among other things, the flood
proofing of new structures is the only feasible manner in which flood damage can be prevented or
minimized in a flood hazard area." Id. at 263, 302 S.E.2d at 209.
46. Helms, 255 N.C. at 653, 122 S.E.2d. at 822.
47. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 264, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
48. Id. at 263-64, 302 S.E.2d at 209-210 (citing Helms).
49. Id. at 264-65, 302 S.E.2d at 210-11.
50. Id. at 264, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 257-60, 265, 302 S.E.2d at 206-08, 210.
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plaintiff's property."53 Thus, it is of no consequence that other uses are
prohibited. 54
This conditional affirmative duty analysis departs from the court's prior
holdings and conflicts with Helms. In Helms the land was not in use at the
time of the zoning change. The court examined whether the available uses
were reasonable;55 the option of allowing the unused condition to continue
was only a part of this inquiry. If a plaintiff in Responsible Citizens was not
using his land when the ordinance was adopted, and all development effec-
tively was prohibited by the "conditional affirmative duties" imposed by the
ordinance, he was left with no available reasonable use. Under Helms, this
deprivation would constitute a taking. Responsible Citizens held that it was
not a taking.
The court's analysis fails to consider factors that constitute a taking under
the federal constitution. The court applied the conditional affirmative duty
rationale and relied on Penn Central in dismissing summarily the challenge
under the federal constitution. 56
Both ordinances place conditional affirmative duties on the land-
owner to meet certain requirements if he or she wishes to engage in
new construction or alterations. Indeed, we find no feature of the
Penn Central case which substantially distinguishes it from the case
at bar-at least to the extent that would render the exercise of police
power invalid or justify a different conclusion on the "taking"
issue.57
The court, however, incorrectly relied on Penn Central for its conditional af-
firmative duty analysis. Penn Central does not discuss the doctrine of condi-
tional affirmative duty. Under the federal and State constitutions, the ends of
the ordinance must be permissible, and the means must be reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate those ends.58 Even if an ordinance passes this test, however,
its enactment constitutes a taking "if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the
owner's use of the property."59 Although the United States Supreme Court
has not developed a framework for this analysis, the factors it has identified as
pertinent to the taking issue do not include whether the regulation imposes a
conditional affirmative duty on the owner.
The Responsible Citizens court's analytic framework does not account for
an established federal factor-interference with investment-backed expecta-
tion in the use of property. If land presently is not in use or is held with an
investment-backed expectation for the development of that land, a regulation
53. Id. at 264, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
54. Id. at 265, 302 S.E.2d at 210.
55. Helms, 255 N.C. at 656-57, 122 S.E.2d at 824-25.
56. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 266-67, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
57. Id. at 267, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
58. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C.
207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
59. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
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that prohibits development may constitute a taking under the federal constitu-
tion.60 Under Responsible Citizens, however, if this prohibition is merely a
constructive prohibition in the form of a conditional affirmative duty, it is not
a taking. Suppose a plaintiff in Responsible Citizens had purchased vacant
commercial property and expended a considerable sum of money to prepare
for construction of a shopping center. If the city council then imposed a con-
ditional affirmative duty that effectively prohibited any development of the
property, a taking would have occurred under the reasoning of Penn Central.6 1
Under Responsible Citizens, however, this zoning would have been a permissi-
ble exercise of the police power.
The court's holding in Responsible Citizens was very broad. The court did
not consider the different possible circumstances of the plaintiffs' property; it
looked only to the form of the ordinance and held it not to constitute a taking.
Furthermore, the trial court had failed to find that the ordinance did not de-
prive plaintiffs of all reasonable use of their property.6 2 If the supreme court
had applied its pre-Responsible Citizens reasonableness standard, it would
have remanded for such a finding.6 3 The court's failure to remand illustrates
that the form of the ordinance as a conditional affirmative duty was crucial to
the outcome.
In Responsible Citizens the North Carolina Supreme Court provided a
simple framework for analyzing the taking issue. The decision, however, casts
doubt on the court's previous taking decisions64 since its conditional affirma-
tive duty analysis has short-circuited the definition of reasonable use an-
nounced in Helms. Although the court attempted to clarify the answers to
questions that have plagued this area of law, it raised more questions than it
answered, leaving the present state of the law uncertain. Because the decision
affords a landowner less protection under the North Carolina Constitution
than under its federal counterpart, the primary question in North Carolina
taking cases will be whether a violation of the fifth amendment has occurred.
Thus, although the court provided a simple framework with which to analyze
North Carolina taking law, it has rendered that framework of little value.
60. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
61. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
62. Record at 20, Responsible Citizens.
63. See Helms, 255 N.C. at 657, 122 S.E.2d at 824-25; Jamison v. City of Charlotte, 239 N.C.
423, 79 S.E.2d 797 (1954). See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
64. Even though the court analyzed the facts broadly, Responsible Citizens seems to be an
example of result-oriented adjudication. The ordinance was enacted for the purpose of allowing
Asheville residents to qualify for federal flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Act.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4001- 4128 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The court apparently felt compelled to uphold
any such ordinance. This predisposition of the court toward upholding the constitutionality of the
ordinance may have affected its analysis in two ways. First, the court was willing to adopt an
analysis broader than its prior decisions. Second, the court cited cases from other jurisdictions
that do not support its analyis. Each of the cases cited, however, upheld similar flood zone ordi-
nances. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1975); Cappture Realty Corp. v. Board of Adjustment of Elmwood Park,
126 N.J. Super. 200, 313 A.2d 624 (1973), aft'd, 133 N.J. Super. 216, 336 A.2d 30 (1975). In both
of these cases, however, the courts did not consider whether the ordinance constituted a taking of
the plaintiffs' property. See, e.g., Turnpike Realy, 362 Mass. at 238, 284 N.E.2d at 901-02 (Tauro,
C.J., concurring).
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Once again, practitioners are left to interpret the "ad hoc factual inquiries" 65
of the United States Supreme Court.
MARTIN K. REIDINGER
65. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
